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Policy Research Working Paper 5214
The “distance effect” measuring the elasticity of trade 
flows to distance has been rising since the early 1970s 
in a host of studies based on the gravity model, leading 
observers to call it the “distance puzzle”. This paper 
reviews the evidence and explanations. Using an extensive 
data set of 124 countries over the period 1970-2005, 
the authors confirm the existence of this puzzle and 
identify that it only applies to poor countries (the bottom 
third in per capita income terms in the sample—i.e., 
the low-income countries according to the World 
Bank classification, 2006). The analysis shows that this 
group has intensified trade with closer partners and 
has chosen new partners that are closer than existing 
partners, leading to a regionalization of their trade at 
This paper—a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the 
department to explore the linkages between trade costs, facilitation, and economic development with support through 
the Multidonor Trust Fund for Trade and Development. The project website is accessible at http://econ.worldbank.org/ 
projects/trade_costs. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors 
may be contacted at celine.carrere@u-clermont1.fr, jaime.demelo@unige.ch, and jswilson@worldbank.org.
both extensive and intensive margins (regionalization 
of trade is absent for the other countries). Combining 
several methods on cross-section and panel estimates 
of the gravity equation, the authors estimate that low-
income countries exhibit a significant rising distance 
effect on their trade, around 18 percent between 1970 
and 2006. There is no more distance “puzzle” for trade 
within richer countries (the top third in per capita 
income terms in the sample). The paper disposes of 
several previous explanations of the puzzle, and notes that 
this regionalization could well be a reflection of increased 
integration of this group of countries in the world 
economy or greater marginalization.1 
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1 1. .   I IN NT TR RO OD DU UC CT TI IO ON N   
 
There is a widespread perception that the current wave of globalization, 
much like the first, should have led to the ‘‘death of distance’’. Its 
importance for developing countries cannot be underestimated since 
under a broad range of models, the magnitude of distance effects 
determines the wage gap with richer countries and the ability to attract 
footloose industries. In a more popular vein, as argued by Thomas 
Friedman in The World is Flat (2005), the fall in communication costs 
which are an integral part of overall transactions costs that are captured by 
distance, should provide a tremendous opportunity for the poorer 
countries to integrate the world economy especially because of their 
backwardness and the rapid spread of reduction in these costs around the 
world.  With quasi-costless communication, outsourcing will increase and 
producers in remote developing countries will now be able to supply far-
away Northern markets for fashion and other differentiated products with 
relatively short shelf-lives. 
 
Under this popular interpretation of the “death of distance” scenario, 
ceteris paribus, the average distance of trade for poorer countries should 
increase (as lower transport costs would open more distant markets). Yet, 
no visible increasing trend in the average distance of trade has been 
detected in the data over the last thirty years for the poorest. Surprising as 
it may seem, this is coherent with the high trade costs reported by 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (AvW, 2004) in their survey. It is also 
consistent with the “distance puzzle” which suggests that the burden of 
distance on trade may have, in fact, been increasing. In terms of the gravity 
literature used to estimate trade costs, a reduction in trade costs should 
imply a smaller “distance effect”, i.e. a declining value (in absolute terms) 
of the elasticity of trade to distance, θ. The challenge then is how to 
reconcile technology driven reduction in trade costs with a non-shrinking 
effect of distance in the large literature estimating trade costs from data on 
bilateral trade.  
 
This puzzle is the subject of this paper. Although we provide several 
estimates of θ, some of which are more plausible than previous ones, this 
is not our main concern (Grossman, 1998 and AvW, 2004 object to its high 
estimated value).1
                                           
1 See the discussion of Grossman’s objection in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004, p. 
729). Taking into account the quality of infrastructure and the choice of mode of transport 
(e.g. air, sea) for a cross-section sample of Asian countries, Shepherd and Wilson (2006) 
obtain a lower estimate 
 Instead, we focus on the causes for the persistent 
finding that it is increasing with time. We focus on the poorest countries 
because it is precisely this group of countries that should benefit most 
0.35 θ = −  .     3 
from a flatter world. This focus is also motivated by our earlier work (Brun 
et al., 2005) where we found that an increasing ‘burden’ of distance was 
restricted to poor countries and conjectured that they may have been 
marginalized by the current wave of globalization. 
 
Section 2 reviews the explanations for this finding: composition effects, 
sample selection, econometric methods and omitted variable bias. This 
preliminary exploration, in part based on a meta-analysis on 103 
published papers (based on the Disdier and Head’s (2008) database), 
leads us to suggest that the puzzle mainly holds for developing countries. 
The rest of the paper seeks to check if this is still the case when 
determinants of distance-sensitive trade costs are brought into the 
determination of bilateral trade. Section 3 analyzes the evolution of the 
average distance of trade, confirming and sharpening the results from the 
meta-analysis. Over time, the third poorest countries in the sample of 124 
countries (i.e. the low-income countries according the World Bank 
classification of 2006) shift, among existing trade partners, towards 
physically closer partners. Also, their new trading partners are closer than 
existing partners. No such pattern is apparent in the data for the 
remaining countries. These findings confirm a changing role of distance in 
bilateral trade. In section 4, we revisit the gravity-predicted θ elasticities. 
To control for as many factors as possible, and to maximize robustness, we 
rely on cross-section and panel formulations and use several methods to 
deal with zero trade flows. In all cases, a distance puzzle is revealed for the 
bottom third (39 countries) in the sample, leading us to conclude that 




2 2. .   T TH HE E   D DI IS ST TA AN NC CE E   P PU UZ ZZ ZL LE E   I IN N   T TH HE E   G GR RA AV VI IT TY Y   L LI IT TE ER RA AT TU UR RE E   
 
2.1. The Rising Distance Effect  
 
While there are several approaches to estimate the impact of transport 
costs on the volume of trade, the great majority of estimates rely on the 
popular gravity model which states that the volume of bilateral trade 
between two countries (i and j) should be proportional to their economic 
size, proxied by GDP ( () ij Y ) and inversely proportional to transport costs, 
proxied by the distance between partners ( ij D ). The numerous studies in 
the literature deliver an estimate of the elasticity of bilateral trade to 
distance,θ  , which is then used to predict bilateral trade volumes as a 
function of distance. For example, using the range of estimates in the 
literature, with  1.4 [ 0.7] θ = −−  doubling the distance reduces trade by 63%   4 
[42%].2
 
 This range is typical of cross-section (sometimes averaged over 5-
year periods) estimates of aggregate trade volumes where trade costs are 
given by: 









= ∏   (1) 
 
Where, the set  m
ij z  (m=1,...,M) includes binary dummy variables (usually 
invariant through time, such as sharing a common border, a common 
language, etc.) capturing other barriers to trade than distance. These costs 
enter log-linearly in the “traditional” gravity equation: 
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and the distance effect is given by the estimate θ αρ = , with  0 α <  being 
the trade elasticity to trade costs  ij t . As discussed by AvW (2004), and as 




  This lead AvW to conclude that distance is in fact 
capturing other barriers to trade (e.g. NTBs, information barriers, and 
contracting Costs and insecurity) not appropriately controlled for in the set 
of dummy variables . 4
 
 
But the real “puzzle” is that estimates of θ   coming from more recent data 
yield larger estimates. These results imply that distance has exerted a more 
powerful (negative) effect on the volume of trade in recent times. This is 
clear from figure 1 below reproduced from a recent meta-analysis of 1,467 
elasticity estimates θ   compiled from gravity model estimates reported in 
over 100 published papers (see Disdier and Head, 2008). This figure plots 
the elasticity estimates against time and fits a kernel smoother through the 
                                           




3 In the theory-based gravity equation, the elasticity of trade to trade costs depends on the 
elasticity of substitution in consumption, σ according to  ( ) 1 ασ = − . Since σ has to be 
estimated separately (as reported by Anderson and Van Wincoop, 5<σ<10), the elasticity 
of trade to distance will, in fact, depend on the ease with which goods can be substituted 
across suppliers. As we discuss below, the composition of trade would then appear to 
matter.   
4 Based on σ=8, they estimate that the overall border barriers to trade amount to around 
50% .    5 
data (dark line).5
 
   From their survey of estimates reported in figure 1 and 
from further analysis of the evolution of the estimates through time (see 
below), Disdier and Head (2008) conclude that the evolution of the 
distance impact on trade was fairly flat until the 1950s, but has shown a 
significant increase in the post-1970 data. 
Figure 1. The rising Distance Effect in Gravity Models 
 
Source: Disdier and Head (2008, figure 3, p.19). 
 
 
To give an idea of the orders of magnitude suggested by the meta-analysis 
summarized in figure 1, distance impedes trade by 37% more since 1990 
that it did from 1870 to 1969. This increasing elasticity of trade to distance 
had already been noticed by Frankel (1997). Earlier, Leamer and 
Levinsohn (1995, pp. 1387–88), reviewing the literature on international 
trade and distance, noted that ‘‘the effect of distance on trade patterns is 
not diminishing over time. Contrary to popular impression, the world is 
not getting dramatically smaller.’’  This paradoxical result, now well 
established, is referred to as the “distance puzzle” or the “missing 
globalization puzzle” (Coe et al. 2007).  
 
2.2. The Gravity model Set-up 
 
Even though most estimates in figure 1 come from the “traditional” gravity 
equation in (2), it is now recognized that gravity-based estimates of 
changes in trade costs give more intuitive and plausible results when 
obtained from theory-based gravity models that point out explicitly the 
channels through which bilateral trade depends on relative trade costs, 
and indirectly, to distance. To take an example, given trade costs (partly 
                                           
5 The highest R² estimate of each paper is shown with a solid circle, and the lighter blue 
lines report the associated lowess smoother estimates.   6 
proxied by distance) will matter less for bilateral trade between New-
Zealand and Australia than for bilateral trade between Greece and 
Switzerland because Australia and New-Zealand are further away from 
their other trade partners than Greece and Switzerland. A large family of 
trade models satisfies the conditions necessary to yield a gravity equation 
at the product level. 6
σ
  Here is one. Take a one sector economy with a 
representative consumer with CES preferences with common 
elasticity among all goods. Impose symmetry of trade costs (tij= tji) and 
assume that trade costs are proportional to trade (no economies of scale in 
transport). Then the delivered price includes an ad-valorem equivalent of 
trade costs (tariffs, NTBs, etc.). With constant returns to scale in transport 
and marginal cost pricing in transport  ( ) 1 ij i ij i ij p pt p τ = = +  and trade 
costs enter multiplicatively as in (2). Under these assumptions, outward 
and inward trade costs   ,  ij PP  are symmetric and the theory-based gravity 
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where  ij M  is the imports of country i from country j ,  () ij Y  is the GDP of 
country i (j), Yw is world GDP, tij is bilateral trade costs between i and j, σ 
>1 is the elasticity of substitution in the CES utility function. According to 
(3)  and  (4), bilateral trade flows depend on the relative size of partners 
and conditionally on relative trade costs where   ,  ij PP   respectively 
represent the inward and outward multilateral trade resistance.  
 
A more satisfactory formulation of trade would recognize that transaction 
costs include several components, and that per-unit transport prices may 
not be equal to transport costs because of market power by transport 
carriers. Using disaggregated US ocean freight rates  over the 1991-2004 
                                           
6 See AvW (2003, 2004). These conditions are: (i) trade separability (i.e. separability in 
preferences and technology as in CES technology and utility); (ii) aggregator of varieties 
are identical and CES across countries; (iii) trade costs are proportional to trade and may 
include local distribution costs, but these costs do not affect trade flows; (iv) consumer 
have CES preferences with a common elasticity of substitution σ across commodities. 
Trade costs do not depend on the quantity of trade, a strong assumption since trade costs 
are likely to depend on the volume of trade.   7 
period and a cross-section of Latin American freight rates, Hummels et al. 
(2009) find that ocean-carrier markups are particularly sensitive to tariffs 
in Latin America and that, jointly with product characteristics, they 
explain an order of magnitude more of the variation in shipping prices 
than distance.7
ij τ
 Thus changes in trade policy and in the degree of 
competition in shipping will change the ad-valorem equivalent of trade 
costs lumped here for convenience under the term  . The reduced-form 
distance-dependent trade cost function would read:  











= + ∏   (5) 
 
where the ad-valorem equivalent of trade costs includes all border trade 
costs, depend on product characteristics and on the market characteristics 
of the transport sector.8
ij t  In practice, the functional form of trade costs   is 
in fact given by  (1). Substituting (1) into (3) and (4), the estimated 
equation in a cross-section setting becomes: 
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= − + + −− + − ∑
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  (6) 
 
In this formulation the income coefficient terms are unity, remoteness 
terms sometimes included in the estimation are derived directly from 
theory (and called multilateral resistance terms) and the “distance effect” 
becomes  ( ) 1 θσ ρ = − , the distance elasticity depending on composition 
effects. Thus a country that would trade mostly homogenous goods with 
close substitutes would face very small trade costs and the gravity model 
would not be useful to learn about trade costs in those circumstances.9
                                           
7  They find that few carriers and high tariffs contribute to the significantly higher 
shipping prices facing developing countries and estimate that a 1% reduction in the tariff 
reduces the shipping price by 1.2% to 2.1% .  
 
Estimates of (6) can be computed from several methods, but most of them 
are obtained by the inclusion of country fixed-effects which is addition to 
8 Even though we follow the literature and use the multiplicative form of the trade cost 
function, it has been criticized as it implies that the marginal effect of a change in one cost 
depends on all other costs. Hummels (1999) suggests the alternative additive trade cost 










= ++   ∑  where fij is the freight rate.  
9 The poor performance of the gravity model for trade among low-income countries is 
well-known. Feenstra (2004, chp.5) attributes this poor performance to the non-
fulfillment of the critical condition of specialization in different commodities for low-
income countries.    8 
producing unbiased estimates, avoids the measurement errors inherent in 
the use of price indexes. About one-quarter of the estimates reported by 
Disdier and Head (2008) includes these country fixed-effects.  As before, a 
“distance puzzle” obtains when the distance effect,  θ , takes larger values 
when estimated from more recent data as exemplified in figure 1.  
 
Economic and econometric arguments have been advanced to explain the 
presence of the puzzle. Unfortunately, Disdier and Head (2008) cannot 
test for each effect separately from the estimates reported in their meta-
analysis. For convenience, we categorize these arguments under the 
headings of sample composition, zeroes in the data and incorporation of 
multilateral resistance and look for the sensitivity in the estimates of  θ  to 
these three set of controls, using the meta-analysis dataset of Disdier and 
Head (2008).  
 
2.3. Sensitivity of Distance Elasticity estimates in existing 
empirical literature  
 
Composition Effects.  Composition effects appearing through the elasticity 
of substitution at the product level, have been invoked most. 10
                                           
10 Disdier and Head (2008) discuss three channels that will yield different estimates of θ 
in theory-based gravity models: differences in σ across products, differences in the 
response of trade costs to distance across goods ρ and differences in productivity across 
firms (see also the discussion in Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004, p.726). 
 Two recent 
studies shed some light. Estimating the distance elasticity of bilateral trade 
for 700 manufactured products in a sample including developing and 
industrialized countries, Berthelon and Freund (2008) find no evidence 
that changes in the composition of trade across manufactured 
commodities accounts for the distance puzzle (but they give some evidence 
that for 40% of industries distance became more important). However, 
compositional changes could take place between broader categories of 
products. In this vein, Melitz (2007) finds supporting evidence for the 
argument that there might have been a shift in trade patterns from 
comparative-advantage-based to intra-industry trade in differentiated 
products with intra-industry trade mostly among North-North countries 
that share similar characteristics. Distance has a positive impact on 
comparative-advantage-based (Ricardian) trade since differences in 
endowments /productivities are positively correlated with distance while it 
has a negative impact for trade in differentiated products. Then, if the 
share of trade based on comparative advantage decreases (which has 
certainly been the case if one considers the evolution of the share of 
agricultural trade in total trade), the negative impact of distance on trade 
will increase mechanically. In a sample including developed and 
developing countries, Melitz (2007) shows that when he introduces the   9 
difference in latitude (as a proxy for Ricardian trade), the elasticity 
estimate of trade to distance falls by half when estimated in several cross-
sections over the period 1970 to 1995.11
 
   
Composition effects may also be at work through omitted variable bias. 
Consider for example the impact that the quality and quantity of social and 
physical infrastructure may have on trade costs that may be captured in 
the elasticity of trade to distance. Trade costs may be higher in countries 
with poor-quality institutions (institutions have been found to be 
persistent and to change little through relatively long time periods). Then 
falling communication costs would result in a smaller decrease of trade 
costs in countries with low-quality social infrastructure. Francois and 
Manchin (2006) find supporting cross-sectional evidence. Likewise, when 
they introduce a proxy for contractual enforcement and corruption in the 
trade cost function, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) find that the implied 
tax equivalent of relatively low-quality institutions is 16%.  Along similar 
lines, Aidt and Gassebner (2008) find that autocratic states trade less. 
While neither finding deals directly with the elasticity of trade to distance, 
nor with its evolution, they suggest that omitted variable bias could have a 
systematic impact on the evolution of the elasticity of trade to distance 
through their impact on trade costs.  
 
Physical infrastructure could also play an important role as first shown by 
Limao and Venables (2001). Brun et al. (2005) estimated an “augmented” 
gravity equation incorporating a time-varying indicator of the quality of 
physical infrastructure. 12
 
  The quality of physical infrastructure has also 
been brought to light in recent estimates that incorporate indicators of the 
quality of road infrastructure (Buys et al., 2006 for Africa and Shepherd 
and Wilson, 2006 for Central Asia).  
The characteristics of trade costs could also contribute towards explaining 
the puzzle. Since international trade involves fixed costs (see the 
discussion of evidence in AvW 2004), if technological progress in shipping 
has been relatively slow in comparison to technical progress in the rest of 
the economy, then the puzzle could show up in the data through an 
increase in transport costs as a fraction of average production costs. This is 
the interpretation of Estevadeordal et al. (2003) who estimated the 
                                           
11 For reference, when we control for the composition of export by the share of primary 
products in total trade, we do not find any effect on the estimated value of  θ. 
12 With this formulation in random-effects estimation over the period 1962-96, Brun et al. 
(2005)  find falling values through time for θ   for trade between countries in the richest 
tercile in the sample, but they find that the distance puzzle persists for trade between the 
poorest-tercile countries in the richest tercile. Shepherd and Wilson (2006) also obtain 
evidence that the quality of infrastructure matters for the volume of bilateral trade.   10 
elasticity of trade to distance for 1913, 1928 and 1938. Brun et al. (2005) 
and Carrère and Schiff (2005) have also suggested this interpretation: the 
elasticity of transport costs with respect to distance could increase if the 
fixed cost component (dwell costs such as port storage costs, loading and 
unloading costs, time in transit, tariffs on imports, etc.) were falling 
sufficiently faster than the variable component (e.g. fuel costs, costs of 
manning and leasing ships). Brun et al. (2005) find that the puzzle holds 
for developing, but not for developed countries. Finally, Hummels (2001) 
and Deardorff (2003) suggest that the influence of time on trade is 
increasing because of greater use of just-in time production. Then this 
would show up as rising distance costs. 
 
Handling zeroes in the data. Recent contributions have explored the 
treatment of zeroes in the data and the handling of the multilateral 
resistance terms. As argued by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Martin 
and Pham (2007) or Eaton and Tamura (1994), ignoring the zero-trade 
data can severely bias gravity equation estimates. Felbermayr and Kohler 
(2006) show that  standard OLS estimates on the sample of positive 
traders will yield downwards- biased estimates of the distance coefficient 
on early data (as zero trade flows due to high trade costs are not taken into 
account) while more recent estimates (with less zero trade flows) are closer 
to the “true” values. In other words, if zero trade flows are positively 
correlated with large distance (which is clearly the case as discussed 
below), then ignoring zero trade flows when estimating the gravity 
equation can generate an “artificial” or spurious distance puzzle.   
 
Relatedly, omitting the multilateral terms when estimating (6) generates a 
bias in the estimation of  ( ) 1 θ σρ = −  since the bilateral distance is 
correlated with these multilateral terms that are left in the error term  ij ε  
(see the discussion in AvW, 2004, page 714).  
 
Finally is the issue of the appropriate functional form for the trade cost 
function. Coe et al. (2007) find declining distance effects when they specify 
the gravity equation with an additive error term and estimate it using 
nonlinear least squares. However, as emphasized by Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2004), this is not clear why such estimation would resolve the 
puzzle. Moreover, using Monte Carlo simulations, Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) find that the nonlinear least squares estimator performs 
very poorly.  
 
Disdier and Head (2008) started exploring these competing explanations 
in empirical literature by estimating the following correlates of the 
distance coefficient in their sample of estimates: 
   11 
70 79 80 89 90 99
01 2 3
m
ij m ij i ij
m
D D D x ue θαα α α β −−− = + + + + ++ ∑              (7) 
 
where  ij θ  is the jth distance coefficient reported in study i, the D variables 
are dummies taking values of 1 when the midyear of the sample used to 
estimate the jth distance coefficient in study i is in the 70s, 80s and 90s 
respectively and  m
ij x is a set of dummy controls. These dummies control for 
the presence of developing countries in the sample, for a correction for the 
zero trade flows, for the use of a country fixed effect, for disaggregated 
data, etc. (see their table 2 on p. 44). Finally, the  i u  are random effects. In 
(7), positive estimates for  1 α ,  2 α  and  3 α  represents the additional distance 
effect in, respectively, [1970-1979], [1980-1989] and [1990-1999] 
compared to pre-1970, once controlled for systematic differences in the 
attributes of the studies through the x vector.  
 
Their results show that using a sample restricted to developing countries 
increases significantly the distance elasticity by 0.44 percentage point in 
the random-effects specification (see their table 2 col. 4 page 44). 
Likewise, they find that incorporating zero trade flows in the sample or 
introducing country fixed effects (i.e. specifying a gravity equation 
consistent with theory) increases the distance coefficient by 0.08 and 0.14 
percentage points respectively. However, even after controlling for all 
these aspects of the estimates that could “artificially” create the distance 
puzzle observed in figure 1, the increasing distance effect after 1970 
remains. In sum, the meta-analysis persists in showing a rising estimate of 
θ   across samples, specifications and econometric methods.  
 
To see if these influences vary with time, we extend their exploration by 
interacting the controls,  m
ij x  with time dummies, i.e. we estimate: 13
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         (8) 
 
We report here results for the three dummy variables that identify the 
presence of:  (i) developing countries; (ii) corrections for the zero trade 
flows; (iii) controls for the multilateral trade resistance terms suggested by 
theory i.e. by including either remoteness variables or country fixed 
effects. 
                                           
13 We thank Anne-Célia Disdier and Keith Head for sharing their database.     12 
 
Coefficients of interest are reported in figures 2a-2c. In general, the 
coefficient estimates do not vary across time except for studies focusing on 
developing countries where a very strong distance puzzle is evident after 
1970 (each sub-period coefficients is significantly different for the one of 
the preceding sub-period). These first results would seem to suggest that 
the most recent developments in the gravity literature on both theoretical 
and econometric sides — controlling for the zeros trade flows or including 
multilateral resistance terms —are unlikely to explain the puzzle observed 
since 1970. 
 
But there are obvious limitations to results obtained from a meta-analysis 
since the estimates we do have not enough points to really appreciate the 
evolution of the distance effect within a sample, within a specification or 
across econometric methods (see Disdier and Head, 2008 for further 
discussion of other shortcomings).14
θ 
 We return to these issues in section 4 
where we explore more systematically the evolution of   in  an integrated 
framework (i.e. within a sample, gravity model specification or 
econometric method). 
                                           
14 For instance, over the 1467 point estimates, only 52 (from 7 different studies) concerns 
developing countries.   13 
 
Figure 2. Distance Puzzle in existing empirical literature 
   
























All with Zero Flows
 











All Country Fixed Effects
 
Source: authors’ calculations from 






3. The Regionalization of Trade for Low-income countries  
 
The gravity model with separability in trade costs has two important 
implications for the evolution of trade. First, it predicts that a relative fall 
in border-related costs should lead countries to increase the volume of 
international trade (relative to internal trade). This prediction is largely 
borne out by the data: since 1980, world production has increased by 75% 
while international trade has increased by 300% (Berthelon and Freund, 
2008). Second, a reduction in all costs related to distance (including better 
1 ˆ α  
1 ˆ α + 1 ˆm α  
2 ˆ α + 2 ˆm α  
2 ˆ α  
3 ˆ α + 3 ˆm α  
3 ˆ α    14 
information about distant markets) should lead countries to increase their 
volume of trade with distant partners, while on the contrary, if the relative 
costs associated with distance increase, countries should trade with closer 
partners. This implication of cost minimization was exploited by Carrère 
and Schiff (2005) who computed the average distance of trade (ADOT) 
directly from the bilateral trade data at successive points in time and more 
recently by Berthelon and Freund (2008) who computed a measure of 









      (9) 
 
where  ijt X are exports from i to j in t, XWt are world exports in t, and Dij is 
distance between i and j. The corresponding potential measure is the 
gravity-predicted bilateral trade in a frictionless world where the volume of 
bilateral trade is proportional to the product of the countries GDPs 
(denoted () it Y ):  
 
  ; = = = ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
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This measure will change only as a result of changes in the dispersion of 
incomes around the world and it will be maximal if all countries have the 
same size. So, in a gravity world, a higher potential trade for a group of 
countries simply means less dispersion in economic size in that group. 
Feenstra (2004, chp. 5) reports results showing that this measure of 
potential trade fits the data quite well for developed countries but less for 
developing countries.  
 
Then, if gravity is an adequate description of the volume of bilateral trade, 
the ratio of potential to actual trade is a measure of trade costs. Since it is 





ttt ADR ADOT ADOT =                      (11) 
 
The values of these ratios are reported for our sample of 124 countries over 
the period 1970-2006.15
                                           
15 The sample includes all countries except microstates and ex-FSU countries giving us a 
balanced sample (see the list of countries in appendix A1, table A1.1). But using the 
complete sample of 190 countries does not change the results presented here and in the 
rest of the paper (results available upon request). Nominal bilateral trade flows (in US$, 
 To iron out fluctuations, each point is a 5-year   15 
average. Because of the preliminary results suggesting that low-income 
countries are different, we also report averages for the richest and poorest 
tercile of countries (each tercile has 39 observations). To ease the reading, 
we set ADRt  to 1 in for the period 1970-1974. It can be seen that the ADR 
ratio is quite stable fluctuating around the value of 1 for the whole sample, 
even though the small decline could be taken to suggest that barriers to 
trade have been increasing in relative terms, leading countries to shift 
trading patterns towards closer partners.  
 
As suggested by the systematically higher estimates of the elasticity of 
trade to distance for developing countries in the meta-analysis, we also 
report separately the potential and actual distance of trade for the poorest 
third (39 countries) in the 124 in the sample with all countries in the 
sample. 16
 
 By selecting all trade of the poorest countries rather than trade 
with only the remaining (85) countries, we are addressing directly the 
issue of whether their trade is becoming more regionalized, regardless of 
the partners.  
Figure 3 shows a higher potential trade for the poorest countries, reflecting 
larger dispersion in incomes for this group. More interesting is the large 
fall in the average distance of trade for this group implying that poor 
countries have increased trade relatively more with nearby than with 
distant partners. For this group the average distance of imports fell by 
more than 15% from 7200 kms in 1970-1974 to 6000 in 2005-2006. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
c.i.f), are taken from UN-COMTRADE (via WITS), divided by the US deflator. We use 
import data as it is well-recognized that they are more accurately reported by the customs 
authorities. For developing country, we use mirror estimates, i.e. export data reported by 
partner countries. GDP and population are taken from the World’s Bank World 
Development Indicators 2008. Distance measure is from the Centre d’Etudes et de 
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). The simple distances are 
calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the 
most important city (in terms of population). 
16 The list of countries is given in appendix A1, table A1.1.  The computation of terciles was 
carried out by splitting the country in three groups on the 1970-2006 average. We then 
checked if the classification would have changed if we had used beginning or end-of-
period GDP figures. Concerning for instance the poorest tercile, compared to the list 
reported in table A1.1, China and Sri Lanka would have been included in this group at the  
beginning of the period (instead of Haiti and Zimbabwe) while Ivory Cost Only would 
have been included in this group (instead of Pakistan) at the end. Note that the poorest 
tercile matches perfectly the low-income country group as defined by the World Bank in 
2006.   16 
Figure 3. Average distance and Indirect Trade Cost Measures for 124 
countries, 1970-2006 
 









































































































Note: 5-years periods over 1970-2004 and a 2-years period 2005-2006  
Source: authors’ calculations on data from UN-COMTRADE and WITS. 
 
 
This changing pattern is reflected in diverging paths of the ADR ratios for 
the whole sample and for the lowest tercile. If the gravity model is an 
adequate of representation of the determinants of trade, then we get in 
figure 3a confirmation of the meta-analysis results of figure 2a: the costs of 
barriers to trade for the poorest countries have gone up in relative terms 
with a fall of 15% in the average distance of trade over the sample period.  
 
Why did poor countries trade relatively more with geographically closer 
partners? 17
                                           
17 To illustrate this point, we report in appendix A4 the 3 main import suppliers of each of 
the 39 poorest countries of the sample with their trade share and distance, for 1970-1975 
and 2005-2006 
  In this simple setting, the only two possibilities are changing 
weights of existing trading partners, or changing trading partners. First, it 
could be that close trading partners (e.g. China and India in Asia) grew 
fast. This would result in the observed regionalization of trade for the 
poorest tercile. If so, we should then also observe a decrease in the average 
potential distance because of the increasing GDP weights for the close 
partners. However, figure 3a indicates that the potential distance of trade 
barely increases, so this effect cannot be a major factor. 17 
Figure 4 Average distance of zero trade flows, Richest and Poorest Terciles. 
 
Note: 5-years periods over 1970-2004 and a 2-years period 2005-2006  
Source: authors’ calculations on data from UN-COMTRADE and WITS 




















































































The other possibility is a change in the composition of trading partners. 
Indeed, as shown in figure 4, over the sample period, the number of zero 
trade flows is quite stable until 1990, around 45% for the poorest tercile 
and 15% for the richest tercile. 18
 
 Then the number of zero trade flows 
decreases sharply and fell by half. In contrast to the richest tercile, the 
average distance of zero trade flows for the poorest tercile is consistently 
higher than for positive trade flows, but the gaps narrow in later years. 
The effect of this expansion of trade and its implication for the average 
distance of trade is shown in figure 5 for the poorest tercile. The figure 
disaggregates the ADOT for the lowest tercile into the two components: (i) 
“traditional”, i.e. existing trade partners with already positive trade flows 
in 1970-1974 (intensive margin); (ii) “new” trade partners with positive 
trade flows since 1975 (extensive margin).  We also report the weights of 
each trading partner (or each margin) in total trade.  
 
Figure 5: Average Trade Distance of Poorest countries with Traditional and 

























































































Nber obs. Import Value
ADOT - Trad. Partners ADOT - New Partners
 
 
Two patterns are evident: first the regionalization of trade is partly 
reflecting the closer distance of the “new” partners that are significantly 
closer than the existing partners and they have an increasing weight in the 
                                           
18 We observe in the mid-1980s a slight increase in the number of zero trade flows 
compared to preceding years mainly for the poorest country’ trade. This slowdown in 
trade growth around the mid-1980s is also visible in Felbermayr and Kohler (2006, 
figures 3a and 3b based on Rose’s database) and in Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein 
(2008, figures 1 and 2, based on Feenstra’s database).  As these new (and temporary) zero 
trade flows also concern geographically close partners, this results in a decrease of the 
unweighted average distance of zero trade flows during the 1980s.    19 
total value of imports. Hence, part of the puzzle is along the extensive 
margin. Second, within the existing “traditional” group, the poorest 
countries have shifted towards or generate new trade with geographically 
closer partners.19  In the absence of data on the product composition of 
new trade partners, it is difficult to know what leads developing countries 
to choose closer trading partners since it could reflect a change in product 
composition as new products are initially shipped to close partners. In any 
case, it is clear from figure 5 that the regionalization of trade is also 
generated by trade redistribution within the intensive margin. 20
 
 
The conclusion from this inspection of the raw data is that the poorest 
countries have increased their trade share with geographically closer 
partners which would be expected from gravity theory if the relative trade 
costs with physically closer partners fell more than trade costs with 
further-away partners. This could be the case if the closer partners are 
those who reduced most their barriers to trade. In addition, even though 
on average partners with zero trade are further away than partners with 
positive trade, when extending trade to new partners, the poorest 
countries have selected those countries that are closest. Both patterns are 
consistent with a minimization of trade costs in a formulation in which 
distance matters. These patterns could also have resulted from the 
proliferation of regional trade agreements among the poorer countries.  
 
The next section explores if this increasing elasticity of trade to distance 
only applies for the poorer countries in the sample after controlling for 
some of the factors that could alter distance-sensitive trade costs. 
 
 
4 4. .   T TH HE E   P PE ER RS SI IS ST TE EN NT T   R RI IS SI IN NG G   D DI IS ST TA AN NC CE E   E EF FF FE EC CT T   F FO OR R   L LO OW W- -I IN NC CO OM ME E   
C CO OU UN NT TR RI IE ES S      
 
If the gravity model is an adequate representation of bilateral trade, one 
should obtain increasing values of the elasticity of trade to distance (the 
“distance effect”), θ  , over time in the gravity model, but only for 
developing countries. This is indeed what comes out of the alternative 
estimates below: repeated cross-sections (each cross-section representing 
a 5 years average) as in the vast majority of cases reported in the meta-
                                           
19 We checked that the patterns described are robust when we drop alternatively India 
(included as reporter in the group of the 39 poorest countries and dominates other 
countries in terms of trade value) and China (included in the 123 partner countries) from 
the sample. Results of figure 5 are unchanged (available upon request). 
20 In a cross-section estimation of trade costs on the number of products exported by a 
country, Allen and Shepherd (2007) find robust and quantitatively significant positive 
estimates of the number of product varieties to a battery of trade costs with lower trade 
costs leading to increases in product varieties.   20 
analysis; and panel estimates in which the estimated coefficient of distance 
is allowed to vary over time. The panel formulation is more suitable to 
incorporate time-dependent trade costs identified in (5) which we do when 
we build a time-series index of the quality of infrastructure. The panel 
estimates also allow for a better control for omitted variables by using 
country-pair specific effects. Hence, under panel estimation, omitted 
bilateral effects are no longer captured by the distance coefficient. On the 
other hand, because the number of zero trade flows is important for most 
of the sample period (especially for the poorest tercile), it is useful to 
explore several methods for controlling for zero values. This is better done 
in cross-section than in panel. We start with cross-section estimates, then 
turn to the panel estimates.  
 
4.1 Cross-section Estimates 
 
We follow the by-now standard approach and estimate: 
 




ij i j ij Dz M   (12) 
 
where  i α  and  j α  are the importer and exporter fixed effects that capture 
the multilateral resistance variables, and all other variables that are 
country specific and that will appear in the panel estimates: GDPs’, 
multilateral term indexes and indices of the quality of infrastructure.21
Dij is the distance between i and j and 
   
m
ij z includes dummy variables 
indicating whether the two countries are contiguous, share a common 
language, or have had a common colonizer.22
 
  In this first stage, we do not 
include the usual preferential trade agreement (PTA) dummy as this is not 
a structural but a policy-based variable that can be both an explanatory 
factor and a result of the “distance puzzle” (see section 4.3).  
Results are reported in table 1 for the first and last periods under different 
estimation methods to account for the zero trade flows in the data with the 
evolution of the estimated distance elasticity reported in figures 6 and 7.23
                                           
21 In this sample with low-income countries it is preferable to use OLS rather than the 
systems approach used by AvW to avoid the measurement error associated with the 
multilateral resistance variables. The log-linear approximation proposed by Baier and 
Bergstrand (2009) will be used in the panel estimates reported below.  
  
Column (1) serves as a reference and reports OLS estimates in which the 
zero trade flows are considered as missing variables (this corresponds to 
the majority of estimates reported in the meta-analysis).  Column (2) 
reports the results from the standard solution in the literature using 
22 from the Centre d’Etudes et de Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).  
23 All results are reported in appendix A3, table A3.1.   21 
( ) ln 1 ij M +  instead of  ( ) ln ij M  as the dependent variable (see e.g. Frankel, 
1997). This increases the mean value of exports by one unit without 
affecting its variance and, with this correction, country-pair with zero 
trade flows are represented by a zero value of the dependent variable 
( ( ) ln 1 ij M + ).  However, the OLS estimator does not take into account the 
censorship of the dependent variable. Column (3) reports the results from 
the Eaton and Tamura (ET, 1994) tobit with  ( ) ln ij aM +  as dependant 
variable. Under the ET estimator, instead of arbitrarily imposing  1 a = , the 
value of the a parameter is endogenously determined and the dependent 
variable will be censored at the value  ( ) ln a .24 Finally column (4) reports 
the results from the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) 
estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to deal with 
heteroskedasticity in log-linear gravity models.25  Because of the 
controversy about the way to deal with zeros in the data, it is useful to 
compare the estimates under the two estimators.26 Note however, that if 
we control for the censorship bias due to the relatively large number of 
zeros in the data, we do not decompose the distance effect into within-
intensive and extensive margins as proposed by Helpman, Melitz and 
Rubinstein (2008). While extending the estimation to explore this issue is 
interesting, and was already explored partly using the descriptive statistics 
in preceding section, a credible improvement would require a plausible  
identification variable for the first step for this sample over 1970-2006.27
                                           
24 We also ran a Tobit estimator on 
    
( ) ln 1 ij M +  which produced similar results to those 
obtained with the Eaton-Tamura estimator (see appendix A3, table A3.1). For the (ET) 
Tobit estimator with country dummies, we did not use the complicated transformation for 
a fixed effects Tobit developed by Honoré (1992) but a “simple” pooled Tobit as developed 
in Wooldridge (2002, pages 540-542). See also Arellano and Honoré (2001, section 7). 
25 We fit conditional fixed effects PPML (see details in Arellano and Honoré, 2001, section 
5). 
26 The PPML estimator handles the inconsistency introduced by log-linearization model 
in the presence of heteroskedasticity, but it is not clear that it is a better estimator to 
handle the presence of zeroes in trade data. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, Santos Silva 
and Tenreyro show that that the PPML estimated of (12) with  ij M as dependent variable 
produce estimates with the lowest bias for different patterns of heteroskedasticity 
(compared to OLS  on  ( ) ln 1 ij M +  and a tobit on  ( ) ln ij aM + , see their table 5 page 30). 
However, Martin and Pham (2008) pointed out that Silva and Tenreyro used a data-
generating-process for their Monte Carlo analysis which is a fundamentally different data 
generating process from that underlying the zero values in models of Eaton and Tamura 
(1994) or Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008).  When correcting the data-generating 
process, Martin and Pham (2008) find that the Eaton and Tamura (1994) Tobit estimates 
have a lower bias than those obtained with the PPML estimator.  
27 To do so would require a two-stage equation estimation procedure with a selection 
equation for the decision to trade across partners (identifying the extensive margin)   22 
Table 1. Barriers to Trade: Cross-section results (124 countries, 1970-2006) 
 
Methods OLS OLS ET- Tobit PPML OLS OLS ET- Tobit PPML
dependent var. ln(M) ln(1+M) ln(a+M) M ln(M) ln(1+M) ln(a+M) M
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnDij -1.066*** -1.115*** -1.231*** -0.668*** -1.429*** -1.336*** -1.325*** -0.710***
(0.0352) (0.034) (0.034) (0.000) (0.0303) (0.038) (0.029) (0.000)
Common Border 0.898*** 0.326* 0.244* 0.367*** 0.821*** 0.613*** 0.584*** 0.555***
(0.142) (0.178) (0.132) (0.000) (0.146) (0.188) (0.115) (0.000)
Common Language 0.702*** 1.001*** 1.201*** 0.328*** 0.967*** 1.112*** 0.967*** 0.203***
(0.0638) (0.058) (0.063) (0.000) (0.0585) (0.064) (0.053) (0.000)
Colonial links 1.315*** 1.401*** 1.329*** 0.589*** 0.639*** 0.663*** 0.695*** 0.00188***
(0.114) (0.134) (0.161) (0.000) (0.109) (0.142) (0.141) (0.000)
Nber Obs. 10,403 15,252 15,252 15,252 13,384 15,252 15,252 15,252
% of zero Trade flows 0% 32% 32% 32% 0% 12% 12% 12%
R² or pseudo-R² 0.698 0.745 0.743 0.877 0.799 0.817 0.910 0.905
2005 1970
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Fixed country effects are not reported. 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
Several patterns stand out in table 1. First, as expected, the dummies have 
the usual signs and usual significance levels. There are some changes in 
the coefficient values over the sample period reflecting expectations from a 
globalizing world. The value of the common language coefficient falls 
drastically through time: based on columns (4) and (8) (the PPML 
estimation), sharing a common language increases trade by 39% in 1970-
74 but only by 22% in 2005-06. Colonial links also become far less 
important quantitatively over the period, increasing trade by around 80% 
in 1970-74 but only 0.2% in 2005-06.  However, we also observe a clear 
and significant increasing impact of distance on trade, coupled with an 
increasing importance of sharing a common border in the 3 last 
specifications. Both confirm the regionalization of trade emphasized 
earlier. 
 
                                                                                                                     
followed by a trade flow equation in the second stage (identifying the intensive margin). 
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) use “regulation costs of firm entry” as 
identification variable for their 1986 cross-section regression.  However, yearly (or five-
year average data) necessary for a credible identification strategy, are not available. 
Another possibility is to achieve identification by functional form assumptions (non-
linearity of the selection equation), using exactly the same set of regressors in the 
selection and the outcome equations (see e.g. Deb and Trivedi, 2006, for an application of 
this method in panel). However, in our case, the identification strategy is not sufficient as 
the outcome equation (the gravity estimation on positive trade flows controlling for the 
“mills” ratio) gives very similar results to those in OLS on ln(M), with an increase in the 
(absolute value of the) distance coefficient of around +30% at the intensive margin during 
the period. Note that in the first stage probit (extensive margin), the impact of distance on 
the probability to trade is decreasing (in absolute value) over time.   23 
The estimates of θ are high, but well in the range of values reported in 
figure 1. Importantly, the PPML elasticity estimate is much lower and 
more plausible than the values obtained with the other estimators. Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) explain this systematic difference in the 
estimated value between the OLS and the PPML estimators by the 
heteroskedasticity rather than by the censorship bias. 28 The explanatory 
power of all the models reported in Table 1 is quite high and increase over 
time, suggesting that the gravity model is a better representation of 
bilateral trade in later years.29
 
  One reason for this better fit would be 
better data, especially for developing countries. Another, would be a 
change in the trade structure of developing countries as development leads 
to a shift towards trade in differentiated rather than homogenous 
products, hence towards a situation closer to that depicted by the gravity 
model (see e.g. the evidence in Feenstra, 2004 and Evenett and Keller, 
2002).  






































OLS - ln(1+M) [-1.12]
ET tobit - ln(a+M) [-1.23] 
PPML - M [-0.67 ]
HT - ln(1+M) [-0.97]
OLS - ln(M) [-1.07 ]
 
Note: 5-years periods over 1970-2004 and a 2-years period 2005-2006  
Corresponding Trade elasticity to distance in 1970 reported into brackets.  
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
                                           
28   See the discussion in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Since the coefficient on the 
PPML represents the marginal estimate of a change in distance on bilateral trade, the 
coefficients also represent trade elasticities to distance.  Note that the OLS on ln(1+M)) 
and ET tobit estimates give very close results on this sample. 
29 R² are not directly comparable to pseudo-R² as the number of observations is not 
always the same and more importantly, the R² are based on sums of squares whereas the 
peudo-R² are based on ratios of log-likelihoods.     24 
Finally, the time-plot of the estimates of θ in figure 6 (with all distance 
coefficients normalized to unity on the first sub-period 1970-1974) 
confirms the existence of a puzzle.  The puzzle is robust across estimators. 
Two conclusions come out of this comparison. First, the strong distance 
puzzle obtained in literature is partly due to the fact that, until recently at 
least, zero values were not handled by OLS estimates with no specific 
correction for the censorship of the sample. However, even after 
controlling for the zero trade flows, the distance puzzle remains highly 
significant. Second, the range of estimates obtained across the different 
methods produces a rather narrow range of estimates with the burden of 
distance on trade significantly higher at the end of the period in the range 
[+6.3%; +7.6%].  Taken together, these results confirm that the distance 
puzzle holds up to the scrutiny of typical econometric problems.  
 
To check whether the increasing values of θ is attributable to the presence 
of developing countries, we re-estimate the (12) by introducing dummy 
variables for the richest and poorest terciles, i.e. we regress: 
   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ln ln ln ln .
m
ij ij m ij
m
I
ij i j ij ij DD z MI λ αααθ θ ν + =+++ + + ∑   (13) 
with alternatively the dummy  ij I equals to 1 if:  
-  i or j belongs to the third poorest countries in the sample; 
-  i and j belongs to the third richest countries. 
 
The results of this estimation are displayed in figures 7.  It is clear that the 
results are due to the presence of developing countries in the sample since 
the estimates of θ in figure 7b show no more significant distance effect 
increase for the richest tercile and this is robust across estimators (except 
for the OLS estimates which are biased).  By contrast the estimate of θ 
increases in the range [+18%; +19.5%] for the poorest tercile. Taken at face 
value, these estimates suggest that a doubling of distance would reduce 
poorest country’s trade by 60% in 1970-74  and by 67% in 2005-2006 
according to the ET tobit results (and respectively 39% and 45% in the 
PPML regressions). 
   25 
Figure 7. Cross-Section Estimates of θ by Tercile 
 














OLS - ln(1+M) [-1.16]
ET tobit - ln(a+M) [-1.33]
PPML - M [-0.72]
HT -ln(1+ M) [-1.01]
 














PPML - M [-0.65]
OLS - ln(1+M) [-0.98]
ET tobit - ln(a+M) [-1.14]
HT -ln(1+ M) [-0.89]
   
Note: 5-years periods over 1970-2004 and a 2-years period 2005-2006, Corresponding 
Trade elasticity to distance in 1970 reported into brackets.  
Source: authors’ calculations 
   26 
4.2. Panel Estimates  
 
Panel estimates allow the introduction of trade costs that vary through 
time and that are lumped together in (5) under the term  ij τ  assumed to 
capture the ad-valorem equivalent of trade costs such as tariffs, 
communication and other transaction costs. In the absence of time-series 
data on border measures and other transaction costs, we follow earlier 
contributions (e.g. Limao and Venables , 2001 and Brun et al., 2005) and 
construct a time-series index of the quality of infrastructure for each 
country which becomes the new proxy for the bilateral transport costs, tijt. 
The augmented distance-dependent trade cost function becomes:30
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
13 2
ijt ij it jt tDKK
ρρ ρ =         (14) 
 
As constructed (see appendix A2), larger values for Ki(j)t indicate a better 
infrastructure. 31Again, the choice of functional form matters. If the cost 
function was additive with the infrastructure component independent of 
distance, the elasticity of transport costs to distance could increase if the 




This trade cost function is introduced in (3) and (4) with country-pair fixed 
effects (FE) to capture the time-invariant characteristics of bilateral trade.  
Since these effects were not captured by the FE in the cross-section 
estimates, the panel estimates offer another robustness check on the 
earlier results although this is at the cost of imposing a trend specification 
for the evolution of distance.  In particular, the country-pair fixed effects 
control for the North-South differences that Melitz (2007) found to reduce 
the estimate of θ by half over the period 1970-1995.33
                                           
30 Since bilateral specific effects capture the time-invariant characteristics of bilateral 
trade, the trade cost function no longer includes the colonial, language and border 
dummy variables. We maintain Dij, our variable of interest, as the use of random effects 
(see below) allow us to estimate the corresponding coefficient (but not the fixed effects 
specification). Nor does trade costs function include fuel costs due to the year dummies. 
  Furthermore, the 
31 To compute the infrastructure index, we use data from the telecommunication sector 
(number of main telephone lines per 1000 workers), and the transportation sector (the 
length of the road and railway network —in km. per sq. km. of land area) and an index of 
the quality in the service of transport (the share of paved roads in total roads) from 
Canning (1998) and World Development Indicators Database (see details in appendix 
A2). 
32  See Brun et al.  (2005, appendix D). 
33 Melitz (2007) regresses in OLS an equation very close to our OLS on ln(M) on 158 
countries over 1970-1995 (five-years sub-periods). He obtained an increase in distance 
coefficient of around +18.8% while we find, over the same period +18.3% (see OLS with 
country fixed effects on ln(M) in figure 6). Once he controlled for North-South distance,   27 
panel specification allows for some asymmetry in the gravity equation 
since the bilateral specific effect on imports of i from j can be different 
from the corresponding bilateral effect of imports of j from i (see equation 
below).34
 
 Finally, year effects are included to capture all year shocks 
common to all country pairs such as variations in the cost of fuel (arguably 
a main factor affecting the marginal cost of transport). 
To account for the variation of the multilateral resistance terms through 
time, we adopt the linear approximation proposed by Baier and Bergstrand 
(2009) to obtain unbiased and consistent reduced-form estimates (see the 
details in appendix A5). The estimated equation is: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
12 3 4
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   ∑∑  are the multilateral resistance 
or  
“remoteness” variables, 35
t λ  and   is a vector of year dummies,  ij λ  the 
bilateral fixed effects (with  ij ji λλ ≠ ) and  ijt ε  the error term.36
 
 A quadratic 
time trend: 
2
12 3 .. θ θθ θ
 ∂∂







         (16) 
 
is introduced in(15) to detect any significant evolution of  ˆ θ . Because 
estimation in panel with bilateral fixed effects (FE) drops  1 θ , we also use a 
bilateral random effects (RE) estimator to obtain an estimate of the impact 
of distance on trade.  Because the GDPs ( () ijt Y ) and infrastructure indices 
                                                                                                                     
Melitz obtained an increase in distance of around +8%, while with our corresponding 
random effect HT specification on ln(M) over 1970-1995  (with implicitly control for 
North-South distance as for all  time-invariant country-pair characteristics) yields an 
estimated increase of +3.1% (computation based on col 4 table A3.2). 
34 Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) motivate their model allowing for zero and 
asymmetric trade flows on data indicating asymmetry in trade flows over 1970-1997.  
35 Virtually the same results are obtained with the ad-hoc remoteness variable which uses 
the logs of the GDP weighted average distance rather than the GDP weighted average of 
the logs of the bilateral distance. 
36 Note that the random effect specification implies 
ijt ij ijt ε µυ = + with  ij µ  is a specific 
bilateral random effect, and 
ijt υ  is the idiosyncratic error term with the usual properties.   28 
( () ijt K ) are correlated with the bilateral random effects ( ij µ ), we correct for 




Results are reported in table 2. Note first that the FE and RE estimates in 
cols. 1 and 2 are very close indicating that endogeneity issues have been 
handled adequately (this is the case for all the variants). Signs and 
magnitude of coefficients are plausible. As suggested by the theory, the 
elasticity of trade with respect to income is significant and close to unity.  
The negative coefficients for the population variables confirm that larger 
countries are more self-sufficient. It could also reflect that for large 
countries, the costs of trading with themselves rather than with others is 
relatively less. The multilateral resistance variables also have the expected 
positive sign. Thus given the absolute distance between i and j, the further 
country i is far from its trade partners, the more country i will trade with j.  
As expected, an improvement in the quality of infrastructure increases 
significantly the volume of trade. One could also interpret these positive 
coefficients in the broader sense of proxies for the quality of social 
infrastructure (physical infrastructure is largely a public good that will be 
underprovided in countries with poor social infrastructure). The distance 
coefficient in the HT specification is close to unity when taking into 
account the zero trade flows (ln(1+Mt)).   
 
The estimated trend from column (2) is reported in figure 6. It is slightly 
higher than the trend estimated with the ET tobit or the PPML (+11% vs. 
7.6% and 6.3% respectively). Using the same approach as in (13), we also 
estimate the trend for the richest and poorest terciles and report the 
results in figure 7. Again, the results are quite close to those obtained by 
the repeated cross-section estimations. While it could be argued that not 
accounting for the censorship of zeroes in the panel estimates might make 
a difference, given the close values across estimators in the cross-section 
results in table 1, it is unlikely that not accounting for truncation would 
have significantly changed the results here. 
 
                                           
37 We carry out a pretest estimator based on Hausman (1978) (see  Baltagi, Bresson and 
Pirotte (2003) to choose between the fixed effects, random effects, and HT estimators. 
The test statistics lead us to choose the HT estimator. See Brun et al. (2005) appendix B 
for the construction of instruments and the choice of estimator.    29 
Table 2. Barriers to Trade: Panel estimations (124 countries, 1970-2006) 
 
Methods FE HT FE HT
dependent var. ln(1+Mijt) ln(1+Mijt) ln(1+Mijt) ln(1+Mijt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP i lnYit  0.754*** 0.763*** 0.818*** 0.813***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.031) (0.008)
GDP j lnYjt  0.906*** 0.914*** 0.959*** 1.011***
(0.009) (0.009) - (0.008)
Distance lnDij  - -0.989*** - -1.071***
0.000 (0.024) 0.000 (0.023)
Pop i lnPOPit -0.590*** -0.352***
(0.052) (0.010)
Pop j lnPOPjt -0.212*** -0.169***
(0.052) (0.010)
Multil. Resistance i lnMRit  2.075*** 1.609*** 1.567*** 1.487***
(0.083) (0.051) (0.883) (0.074)
Multil. Resistance j lnMRjt 1.573*** 1.209*** 1.135 1.230***
(0.083) (0.051) (0.066) (0.074)
Infra i lnKit 0.208*** 0.191*** 0.268*** 0.256***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.029) (0.009)
Infra j lnKjt  0.176*** 0.159*** 0.281*** 0.227***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.033) (0.009)
trend in Dist tlnDij  0.00961*** 0.0111*** 0.0110*** 0.0110***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
trend² in Dist t²lnDij  -0.000376*** -0.000377*** -0.000382*** -0.000381***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bilateral specific effects yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
417,110 417,110 417,110 417,110
12,432 12,432 12,432 12,432
N. obs
N. country pairs
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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4.3. Further robustness tests 
 
We carried out 4 further robustness tests, 2 on the trend estimates in table 
2 (not reported here) and 2 on the interpretation of the evolution of the 
distance coefficient for Low-Income countries in both panel and cross-
section estimates.  
 
First, we checked the sensitivity of estimates in table 2 to imposing unitary 
elasticities on the GDPs. The results are unchanged. Second, we controlled 
for composition effects that preoccupied Melitz (2007) using the share of 
primary exports to control for the composition of exports (comparative-
advantage based products vs. differentiated products).38
 
 As expected, a 
larger share of primary exports is associated with lower bilateral trade 
confirming the stylized fact that freight rates are higher for primary 
products than for manufactures because of the weight factor. But the 
distance estimates remain unchanged.  
In sum, the robustness checks from the panel results which allow for 
bilateral (and asymmetrical) do not alter the result that the elasticity of 
trade to distance has increased for the lower-income countries.   
 
We next check whether the Low-Income Distance effect here is not a Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) effect as three-quarters of the Low-Income (LI) 
countries are in SSA (see table A1.1).  To check this, we introduce an 
interactive dummy for SSA countries with distance in equation (13). The 
cross-section PPML estimation for sub-periods 1970-1975 and 2005-2006 
(with country fixed effects) reveals that the distance effect for SSA LI 
countries increases by 27% while for other LI countries it increases by 14%. 
This heterogeneity in the LI country group is confirmed by the Hausman-
Taylor estimation in panel: +22% for SSA-LI countries and +11% for other 
LI countries.  There seems to be an African specificity even if the distance 
effect increase for other LI countries is far from negligible. However, it is 
difficult to disentangle the LI from the SSA effect since, as noted above, 30 
countries out of 39 in the LI group are from SSA (and 30 out of the 36 SSA 
countries in the sample are also LI countries). 
 
Finally, we check for a potential effect coming from partnership in a 
Regional Integration Agreement (RIA), though this effect is difficult to 
discern in the data since most LI countries are involved in multiple RIAs. 
We add a PTA dummy in equation (13) and run the cross-section PPML 
estimation for sub-periods 1970-1975 and 2005-2006 (with country fixed 
                                           
38 Bertelon and Freund (2008) decompose the change in the distance coefficient into 
compositional and distance sensitivity effects. Ad-valorem freight rates for SITC 0-4 are 
about 50% higher than for SITC 5-9 (see Hummels (1999 table 1).    31 
effects), the strong distance effect for the LI group vanishes. 39
 
 However, 
this result is difficult to interpret since, during this long period, virtually all 
LI countries reported in table A1.1 participate in at least one PTA with 
their neighbors. Then, the PTA dummy is also likely to capture other 
factors contributing to the regionalization of world trade. For instance, 
participation by LI countries in the Trade Facilitation initiative could 
contribute to a relative decrease of fixed cost vs. variable costs (i.e. 
distance dependant costs) as administrative costs related to trade 
decrease. This effect captured by the PTA dummy could, in turn explain 
the observed regionalization of trade.  Moreover, the implementation of a 
PTA can be endogenous to the regionalization of trade! In the end, the PTA 
dummy only confirms an increasing trade with nearby countries.  
5. Conclusions 
 
The increasing distance effect in bilateral trade, now well-established in 
the literature on gravity-based trade (hence the “distance puzzle”) has 
been addressed in several papers. Among the explanations put forth, the 
proper specification and estimation of the gravity equation ranks first with 
focus on the econometric methods (e.g. the treatment of zero trade flows, 
heteroskedasticity). Other explanations have focussed on omitted variable 
bias (e.g. country fixed effects or the introduction of multilateral resistance 
terms), and on sample selection (developed vs. developing countries). 
Using several approaches, we confirm that the distance puzzle is related to 
the sample: only the bottom third in a sample of 124 countries exhibit a 
rising distance effect, with the estimate of θ increasing in the range [+18%; 
+19.5%] over 1970-2006 regardless of the method used. Inspection of the 
data confirms that this result is not spurious as the “average distance of 
trade” has only fallen for this group of poorest countries, both at the 
extensive (new trade partners) and intensive (existing trade partners) 
margins. Hence, the last thirty-five years have witnessed a regionalization 
of trade for the low-income countries.  
 
Several possibilities of this regionalization of trade for the low-income 
countries could be explored. As shown by Berthelon and Freund (2008), 
products in some industries are becoming more substitutable making 
distance loom larger as small changes in costs will lead to larger shifts in 
the sourcing of trade.40
                                           
39 We use the PTA dummy variable available on the J. Bergstrand homepage, see 
  Regionalization of trade might also reflect the 
implementation of the multiple PTAs that have proliferated among LI 
countries.  We also suggested that this regionalization could reflect the 
http://www.nd.edu/~jbergstr/DataEIAs2006/EIA5yData2006.htm  
40 in a gravity model derived from fundamentals, the distance coefficient is  one minus the 
elasticity of substitution.   32 
dramatic decrease in s host of costs independent of distance (MFN tariffs, 
border-related costs, administrative costs, communication costs or 
increasing containerization), all of which would enhance the relative 
importance of transport costs that depend on distance. 
 
The multiple possibilities underlying the observed regionalization of LI 
trade does not allow one to draw welfare implications.  For example, 
regional trade integration resulting from a preferential tariff reduction for 
neighboring countries can generate either beneficial trade creation or 
harmful trade diversion reflected in both new trade flows with nearby 
countries and/or a switch of trade from distant towards geographically 
closer partners.  
 
The regionalization of trade could also reflect ‘deep’ integration effects as 
administrative and technical barriers to trade are being reduced more 
rapidly for the LI country group relative to others over the period, 
generating new trade flows that are welfare-increasing. For example, a 
reduction in trade frictions in LI countries could provide an incentive to 
move from the informal sector to the formal sector or from the previous 
formal sector in home trade to the one engaged in foreign trade.  This 
would promote foreign trade generally, but because of the persistence of 
transport costs in foreign trade, would especially favor foreign trade with 
close trading partners. If so, this welfare-increasing regionalization of 
world trade would be captured by the gravity model. Then the indirect 
evidence (since we do not have time-series data on the evolution of trade 
costs) in this paper would be good news as it would mean a deepening 
integration of this group of countries into the World Trading System.   
 
A less optimistic view can be drawn if one assumes that, over the period, a 
growing part of world trade is generated by vertical specialization and just-
in-time production.  In this case, trade costs can be viewed as a growing 
impediment in the supply-chain of production. Then, if low-income 
countries’ trade costs (in particular distance-dependant, such as high 
markups in international shipping) remain high compared to other 
developing countries’ trade costs, the observed regionalization of trade 
could be interpreted as a marginalization of these countries. 
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Appendix A.1. Countries in the Sample 
 
Table A1.1. Sample of 124 countries (i.e. without microstates and ex-FSU)  
 




Third Tercile (GDPpc>4,163$) GDPpc missing
Bangladesh Albania Argentina Afghanistan
Benin Algeria Australia Cuba
Burkina Faso Angola Austria Korea, Dem. Rep.
Burundi Bolivia Belgium-Luxembourg Myanmar
Cambodia Brazil Canada Somalia
Central African Republic Bulgaria Czech Republic
Chad Cameroon Denmark
Congo, Dem. Rep. Chile Finland
Ethiopia(includes Eritrea) China France
Gambia, The Colombia Gabon
Ghana Congo, Rep. Germany
Guinea Costa Rica Greece
Guinea-Bissau Cote d'Ivoire Hong Kong, China
Haiti Dominican Republic Ireland
India Ecuador Israel
Kenya Egypt, Arab Rep. Italy
Lao PDR El Salvador Japan




Mauritania Iran, Islamic Rep. Mexico
Mongolia Iraq Netherlands





Rwanda Nicaragua Saudi Arabia
Senegal Panama Singapore
Sierra Leone Papua New Guinea Spain
Sudan Paraguay Sweden
Tanzania Peru Switzerland
Togo Philippines Trinidad and Tobago
Uganda Romania United Arab Emirates
Vietnam South Africa United Kingdom
Yemen Sri Lanka United States
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Appendix A2. The Infrastructure Index 
 
To compute the infrastructure index, we use a large panel data set comprising 144 countries, 
spanning the years 1962-2006. We use data from the telecommunication sector (number of 
main telephone lines per 1000 workers), and the transportation sector (the length of the road 
and railway network —in km. per sq. km. of land area) and an index of the quality in the 
service of transport (the share of paved roads in total roads) from Canning (1998) and World 
Development Indicators Database. 
 
Reconciliation of the infrastructure series 
 
We use 4 indicators 
-  the number of main telephone lines per 1000 workers; 
-  the length of the road network —in km. per sq. km. of land area; 
-  the length of the railway network —in km. per sq. km. of land area; 
-  the length of the road network —in km. per sq. km. of land area; 
 
For these indicators, we use two database: (i) Canning (1998) covering 144 countries over 
1960-1995 and (ii) the World Development Indicators Database with data essentially from 
1980 to 2006. Table A2.1 reports, for each of the 4 indicators, the number of non missing 
observations in the Canning Database, in the WDI database and the number of overlapping 
observations (country / year observations that are non missing in both database). 
 
To reconciliate the Canning and WDI database we proceed, for each of the 4 indicators and 
each country, in three steps: 
(i)  We compute the trend in the infrastructure indicator based on Canning database 
over 1962-1995 and, based on this estimated trend, we generate the predicted 
infrastructure for 1995-2006. 
(ii)  We compute the ratio of the WDI data on the corresponding predicted (or observed 
when overlapping) indicator based on the Canning database; we reconciliate the   
series if the ratio is in the range [0.8; 1.2], which is the case for 92% of the WDI 
observations, we put a missing value otherwise; 
(iii)  We reestimate a trend on the reconciliated data and complete the missing value with 
the predicted indicator. 
 
Table A2.1 reports the proportion, in the reconciliated data, of observation from Canning, 
WDI and computed from the estimated trend.  
 
Table A2.1: Number of non missing observations 
 
 
We have all information on Telephone, road and paved road for the whole sample over 1962-
2006. Concerning the railway, data are missing over the whole period for 16 countries.41
 
 
                                           
41 Bahamas, Belize, Bhutan, Canada, Germany, Lao, Portugal, Samoa, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St 
Vincent and Grenadine, Sudan, Tonga, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu.   39 
Computation 
 
We choose to employ a single infrastructure indicator for the empirical analysis of bilateral 
trade for mainly 2 reasons. The first one is the high correlation among measures of various 
kinds of infrastructure -- telecommunications, road and railway networks. For example, we 
find that the correlation between measures of telephone and road density is 0.5, and between 
rail and railway density is close to 0.6. In a linear regression framework, this close 
association among different infrastructure categories makes it hard to obtain reliable 
estimates of the individual coefficients of variables representing different kinds of 
infrastructure assets. The second reason is that, due to the quality of the infrastructure data, 
it is certainly too ambitious to try to assess with accuracy the impact of each infrastructure 
components while using these data in an aggregate index allow us to capture the broad 
picture on country’s infrastructure.    
 
For these reasons, we build synthetic indices that summarize various dimensions of 
infrastructure and its quality. We propose 2 alternative indexes following: 
  
(i) Limao and Venable (2001), Brun et al. (2005) and compute an simple average of the 
density of the road network, the paved road network, the rail network, and the number of 
telephones per person - we first normalize the variables to have the same mean, one, and 
then take the linear average over the four variables, ignoring the missing observations. This is 
equivalent to assuming that roads, paved roads, railways and telephones lines are perfect 
substitutes as inputs to a transport services production functions. 
 
(ii) Calderon and Serven (2004) or Francois and Manchin (2007) and apply principal 
component analysis to disaggregate infrastructure indicators; our synthetic indices are given 
by the first principal component of the underlying variables. Note that before applying 
principal component analysis, the 4 underlying variables are standardized (mean 1 and 
variance 1) in order to abstract from units of measurement. 
 
The first principal component of the 4 variables accounts for 67% of their overall variance 
and, as expected, it is highly correlated with each individual measure included. Specifically, 
the correlation between the first principal component and main telephone lines is 0.74, its 
correlation with the length of the railways network is 0.67, and with the length of the road 
and paved road network is 0.91 and 0.93 respectively. In addition, all 4 infrastructure 
variables enter the first principal component with approximately similar weights:42
 
 
0.5537 0.5661 0.4081 0.4544
pca




it K  is the synthetic index of infrastructure from the principal component analysis. 43
 
 
Note that the correlation between the 2 infrastructure indexes (simple average and the first 
principal component) is 0.9971! 
 
 
                                           
42 The principal components are normed to 1 (sum of the squares of the weights is 1). 
43 For the 16 countries with missing data on the paved road network variables, we compute the first 
principal component of the 3 other variables: 
0.5725 0.5598 0.5990
pca
it it it it K Road Rail Tel = ++    40 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Figure A2.1. Evolution of the infrastructure index, 
pca
it K  1962-2006.  
a. By Income 
 
 
b. By Region among the non High Income countries 
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Appendix A3. Tables of Results 
 
Table A3.1. Five-years periods – all sample (124 countries, i.e. 15,152 obs. per period) 
Methods OLS Tobit ET- Tobit PPML OLS Tobit ET- Tobit PPML
dependent var. ln(1+M) ln(1+M) ln(a+M) M ln(1+M) ln(1+M) ln(a+M) M
lnDij -1.115*** -1.380*** -1.231*** -0.668*** -1.148*** -1.394*** -1.249*** -0.666***
(0.034) (0.044) (0.034) (0.000) (0.036) (0.044) (0.032) (0.000)
Common Border 0.326* 0.224 0.244* 0.367*** 0.345* 0.299 0.257** 0.329***
(0.178) (0.217) (0.132) (0.000) (0.176) (0.210) (0.127) (0.000)
Common Language 1.001*** 1.479*** 1.201*** 0.328*** 0.937*** 1.289*** 1.006*** 0.259***
(0.058) (0.075) (0.063) (0.000) (0.060) (0.074) (0.060) (0.000)
Colonial links 1.401*** 1.350*** 1.329*** 0.589*** 1.317*** 1.286*** 1.260*** 0.391***
(0.134) (0.165) (0.161) (0.000) (0.144) (0.174) (0.156) (0.000)
lnDij -1.152*** -1.272*** -1.265*** -0.683*** -1.182*** -1.283*** -1.105*** -0.659***
(0.038) (0.047) (0.032) (0.000) (0.035) (0.044) (0.029) (0.000)
Common Border 0.151 0.0996 0.135 0.347*** 0.141 0.111 0.188 0.502***
(0.183) (0.222) (0.125) (0.000) (0.173) (0.215) (0.115) (0.000)
Common Language 1.008*** 1.361*** 0.985*** 0.232*** 1.064*** 1.425*** 0.988*** 0.320***
(0.063) (0.079) (0.059) (0.000) (0.060) (0.078) (0.054) (0.000)
Colonial links 1.165*** 1.119*** 1.117*** 0.292*** 1.030*** 0.997*** 0.980*** 0.0669***
(0.143) (0.177) (0.153) (0.000) (0.134) (0.172) (0.137) (0.000)
lnDij -1.195*** -1.311*** -1.169*** -0.640*** -1.325*** -1.403*** -1.309*** -0.646***
(0.033) (0.039) (0.027) (0.000) (0.031) (0.033) (0.026) (0.000)
Common Border 0.327** 0.328* 0.350*** 0.639*** 0.677*** 0.655*** 0.639*** 0.719***
(0.164) (0.193) (0.109) (0.000) (0.156) (0.166) (0.104) (0.000)
Common Language 1.115*** 1.367*** 1.017*** 0.309*** 1.090*** 1.205*** 1.015*** 0.227***
(0.059) (0.071) (0.051) (0.000) (0.055) (0.060) (0.048) (0.000)
Colonial links 0.945*** 0.910*** 0.919*** -0.00646*** 0.727*** 0.710*** 0.737*** -0.0356***
(0.124) (0.153) (0.132) (0.000) (0.116) (0.128) (0.129) (0.000)
lnDij -1.334*** -1.385*** -1.328*** -0.682*** -1.336*** -1.432*** -1.325*** -0.701***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.026) (0.000) (0.038) (0.043) (0.029) (0.000)
Common Border 0.776*** 0.770*** 0.740*** 0.652*** 0.613*** 0.636*** 0.584*** 0.555***
(0.156) (0.165) (0.105) (0.000) (0.188) (0.212) (0.115) (0.000)
Common Language 1.106*** 1.195*** 1.042*** 0.190*** 1.112*** 1.265*** 0.967*** 0.203***
(0.054) (0.058) (0.048) (0.000) (0.064) (0.075) (0.053) (0.000)
Colonial links 0.585*** 0.566*** 0.602*** -0.0135*** 0.663*** 0.668*** 0.695*** -0.00188***







5-years periods over 1970-2004 and 2-years subperiods 2005-2006.  
importer and exporter dummies in all regressions. 
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Table A3.2. Panel estimations – all sample (190 and 124 countries)  
Methods FE HT FE HT FE HT FE HT
dependent var. ln(Mijt) ln(Mijt) ln(Mijt) ln(Mijt) ln(1+Mijt) ln(1+Mijt) ln(1+Mijt) ln(1+Mijt)
sample 190 countries 190 countries 124 countries 124 countries 190 countries 190 countries 124 countries 124 countries
GDP i lnYit  0.993*** 0.988*** 1.004*** 1.021*** 0.652*** 0.630*** 0.754*** 0.763***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
GDP j lnYjt  1.324*** 1.329*** 1.336*** 1.367*** 0.781*** 0.759*** 0.906*** 0.914***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Distance lnDij  - -1.417*** - -1.530*** - -0.650*** - -0.989***
0.000 (0.038) 0.000 (0.040) 0.000 (0.020) 0.000 (0.024)
Remoteness i Rit  1.906*** 1.554*** 1.464*** 1.166** 2.086*** 1.846*** 2.075*** 1.609***
(0.120) (0.080) (0.127) (0.084) (0.067) (0.042) (0.083) (0.051)
Remoteness j Rjt 0.388*** 0.759*** 0.605*** 1.219*** 1.901*** 1.596*** 1.573*** 1.209***
(0.118) (0.079) (0.125) (0.083) (0.067) (0.042) (0.083) (0.051)
Infra i lnKit 0.179*** 0.163*** 0.298*** 0.280*** 0.0531*** 0.0539*** 0.208*** 0.191***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Infra j lnKjt  0.270*** 0.256*** 0.415*** 0.406*** 0.0157** 0.0160** 0.176*** 0.159***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
trend in Dist t.lnDij  -0.00288** -0.00198* -0.00181* -0.00188* 0.00548*** 0.00747*** 0.00961*** 0.0111***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
trend² in Dist t².lnDij  -0.0000215 -0.0000362 -0.0000244 -0.0000309 -0.000321*** -0.000335*** -0.000376*** -0.000377***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bilateral specific effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
365,492 365,492 292,465 292,465 592,294 592,294 417,110 417,110
16,974 16,974 12,039 12,039 18,360 18,360 12,432 12,432
R² 0.138 . 0.159 . 0.151 . 0.18 .
N. obs
N. country pairs
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  










Appendix A4. Evolution of the 3 Main import suppliers of the 39 poorest countries of the sample 
 















Bangladesh 1 United States 27% 12680 India 16% 1422 India 20% 1422
Bangladesh 2 India 15% 1422 China 13% 3036 Singapore 10% 2888
Bangladesh 3 Japan 10% 4904 Singapore 10% 2888 Hong Kong, China 8% 2439
Benin 1 France 37% 4727 France 21% 4727 France 16% 4727
Benin 2 Germany 8% 5033 Thailand 6% 10704 Thailand 13% 10704
Benin 3 United States 7% 8417 United Kingdom 6% 5026 Côte d'Ivoire 9% 733
Burkina Faso 1 France 47% 4083 France 26% 4083 Côte d'Ivoire 33% 823
Burkina Faso 2 Côte d'Ivoire 19% 823 Côte d'Ivoire 21% 823 France 31% 4083
Burkina Faso 3 United States 6% 7641 Togo 5% 762 Belgium 4% 4320
Burundi 1 Belgium 24% 6484 Kenya 15% 867 Kenya 19% 867
Burundi 2 France 15% 6372 Tanzania 12% 1172 Italy 15% 5316
Burundi 3 Germany 15% 6460 Belgium 11% 6484 Belgium 13% 6484
Cambodia 1 United States 48% 14208 Thailand 26% 536 Thailand 32% 536
Cambodia 2 Thailand 10% 536 Singapore 17% 1152 China 18% 3351
Cambodia 3 Singapore 10% 1152 Hong Kong, China 16% 1542 Hong Kong, China 15% 1542
Central African Rep. 1 France 48% 5186 France 41% 5186 France 24% 5186
Central African Rep. 2 Spain 9% 4592 Cameroon 11% 790 Netherlands 20% 5486
Central African Rep. 3 Cameroon 8% 790 United States 11% 9919 United States 13% 9919
Chad 1 France 50% 4248 France 31% 4248 France 25% 4248
Chad 2 Nigeria 16% 1415 United States 26% 9052 United States 15% 9052
Chad 3 Cameroon 5% 1001 Cameroon 9% 1001 Cameroon 7% 1001
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 Belgium 21% 6225 South Africa 19% 3314 South Africa 19% 3314
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 Germany 13% 6257 Belgium 18% 6225 Belgium 13% 6225
Congo, Dem. Rep. 3 United States 13% 10270 France 10% 6050 France 9% 6050
Ethiopia(incl. Eritrea) 1 Italy 15% 4473 United States 15% 11221 Saudi Arabia 22% 1930
Ethiopia(incl. Eritrea) 2 Japan 14% 10401 China 13% 8316 China 17% 8316
Ethiopia(incl. Eritrea) 3 Germany 12% 5541 Saudi Arabia 11% 1930 United States 9% 11221
Gambia, The 1 United Kingdom 28% 4484 Senegal 13% 156 Senegal 17% 156
Gambia, The 2 China 10% 12366 United Kingdom 9% 4484 Côte d'Ivoire 11% 1656
Gambia, The 3 Japan 10% 14027 Brazil 8% 5254 Brazil 8% 5254
Ghana 1 United Kingdom 19% 5114 Nigeria 10% 423 China 12% 11832
Ghana 2 Germany 14% 5154 United Kingdom 9% 5114 Nigeria 10% 423
Ghana 3 United States 14% 8246 United States 8% 8246 India 6% 8498
1970 -1974 2000 -2004 2005 -2006
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Guinea 1 France 32% 4692 France 16% 4692 China 13% 12652
Guinea 2 United States 17% 6673 Belgium 8% 4953 France 12% 4692
Guinea 3 Italy 10% 4537 United States 8% 6673 United States 8% 6673
Guinea-Bissau 1 Portugal 53% 3059 Senegal 26% 364 Senegal 26% 364
Guinea-Bissau 2 United Kingdom 11% 4628 Portugal 23% 3059 Italy 21% 4315
Guinea-Bissau 3 Netherlands 6% 4868 China 8% 12441 Portugal 19% 3059
Haiti 1 United States 59% 2476 United States 59% 2476 United States 55% 2476
Haiti 2 Japan 7% 13116 Colombia 3% 1577 Brazil 4% 5452
Haiti 3 Canada 6% 2871 Japan 3% 13116 Colombia 4% 1577
India 1 United States 23% 11762 United States 10% 11762 China 11% 3785
India 2 Japan 12% 5848 Belgium 8% 6420 United States 7% 11762
India 3 United Kingdom 11% 6721 China 7% 3785 Saudi Arabia 6% 3053
Kenya 1 United Kingdom 32% 6828 United Arab Emirates 13% 3438 India 15% 5439
Kenya 2 Japan 14% 11266 United States 10% 11853 United Arab Emirates 15% 3438
Kenya 3 Germany 12% 6510 South Africa 9% 4106 United States 9% 11853
Lao PDR 1 Thailand 45% 525 Thailand 63% 525 Thailand 72% 525
Lao PDR 2 United States 16% 13488 China 10% 2779 China 11% 2779
Lao PDR 3 Japan 13% 4144 Vietnam 9% 479 Singapore 3% 1863
Liberia 1 Japan 61% 14434 Korea, Rep. 33% 13479 Korea, Rep. 45% 13479
Liberia 2 Norway 11% 6235 Japan 19% 14434 Japan 17% 14434
Liberia 3 Germany 6% 5283 France 15% 4892 Singapore 15% 12721
Madagascar 1 France 53% 8763 France 23% 8763 China 20% 9676
Madagascar 2 Germany 10% 8764 China 14% 9676 France 20% 8763
Madagascar 3 Japan 6% 11423 Hong Kong, China 7% 8573 South Africa 7% 3327
Malawi 1 South Africa 20% 2708 South Africa 45% 2708 South Africa 39% 2708
Malawi 2 United Kingdom 19% 7993 Mozambique 8% 1342 Mozambique 14% 1342
Malawi 3 Zimbabwe 19% 522 Zimbabwe 7% 522 Zimbabwe 6% 522
Mali 1 France 38% 4140 France 20% 4140 Senegal 24% 1047
Mali 2 Côte d'Ivoire 15% 927 Côte d'Ivoire 18% 927 France 22% 4140
Mali 3 United States 9% 7086 Senegal 10% 1047 Côte d'Ivoire 16% 927
1970 -1974 2000 -2004 2005 -2006
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Mauritania 1 France 42% 3795 France 21% 3795 France 16% 3795
Mauritania 2 Senegal 14% 422 Belgium 8% 4057 China 8% 11904
Mauritania 3 United States 9% 6036 Spain 7% 2742 United States 8% 6036
Mongolia 1 Czech Republic 48% 6296 China 34% 1172 China 47% 1172
Mongolia 2 Hungary 42% 6193 Korea, Rep. 17% 2003 Korea, Rep. 12% 2003
Mongolia 3 Japan 3% 3019 Japan 10% 3019 Japan 11% 3019
Mozambique 1 Portugal 22% 8409 South Africa 50% 1622 South Africa 44% 1622
Mozambique 2 Germany 15% 8975 Australia 6% 10739 India 7% 7724
Mozambique 3 United Kingdom 11% 9198 United States 5% 13211 China 5% 11347
Nepal 1 India 59% 801 India 49% 801 India 78% 801
Nepal 2 Japan 15% 5166 Singapore 8% 3542 Singapore 3% 3542
Nepal 3 Germany 5% 6859 China 6% 3161 Germany 2% 6859
Niger 1 France 41% 3933 France 16% 3933 France 18% 3933
Niger 2 United States 12% 7873 Côte d'Ivoire 9% 1133 United States 17% 7873
Niger 3 Germany 9% 4245 United States 9% 7873 Côte d'Ivoire 7% 1133
Nigeria 1 United Kingdom 27% 5025 United Kingdom 11% 5025 United States 12% 8493
Nigeria 2 Germany 14% 5021 United States 10% 8493 United Kingdom 10% 5025
Nigeria 3 United States 12% 8493 France 8% 4722 Netherlands 9% 5110
Pakistan 1 United States 24% 11092 Saudi Arabia 12% 2742 Saudi Arabia 11% 2742
Pakistan 2 Japan 11% 5980 United Arab Emirates 10% 2084 China 10% 3883
Pakistan 3 Germany 10% 5561 Kuwait 8% 2427 United Arab Emirates 10% 2084
Rwanda 1 Belgium 29% 6360 Kenya 24% 756 Kenya 29% 756
Rwanda 2 Japan 15% 11914 Belgium 11% 6360 Germany 9% 6331
Rwanda 3 Germany 13% 6331 Germany 9% 6331 Uganda 9% 377
Senegal 1 France 44% 4217 France 25% 4217 France 23% 4217
Senegal 2 Germany 6% 4643 Nigeria 14% 2461 United Kingdom 8% 4384
Senegal 3 United States 6% 6157 Thailand 6% 12506 Nigeria 7% 2461
Sierra Leone 1 United Kingdom 28% 4934 United Kingdom 17% 4934 Germany 12% 5129
Sierra Leone 2 Japan 11% 14363 Germany 17% 5129 Côte d'Ivoire 11% 1083
Sierra Leone 3 United States 9% 6947 United States 7% 6947 United Kingdom 8% 4934
Sudan 1 United Kingdom 16% 4942 Saudi Arabia 13% 1798 China 23% 8402
Sudan 2 India 13% 4801 China 12% 8402 Saudi Arabia 11% 1798
Sudan 3 China 9% 8402 United Arab Emirates 8% 2490 United Arab Emirates 7% 2490
1970 -1974 2000 -2004 2005 -2006
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Tanzania 1 United Kingdom 20% 7505 South Africa 14% 3698 South Africa 15% 3698
Tanzania 2 Japan 13% 11404 Kenya 9% 677 China 11% 9423
Tanzania 3 Germany 13% 7187 China 8% 9423 India 8% 5667
Togo 1 France 35% 4753 France 19% 4753 United Kingdom 16% 5048
Togo 2 Germany 11% 5069 India 12% 8310 France 16% 4753
Togo 3 United Kingdom 10% 5048 Netherlands 6% 5150 Netherlands 9% 5150
Uganda 1 United Kingdom 26% 6469 Kenya 34% 506 Kenya 30% 506
Uganda 2 Japan 13% 11539 United Arab Emirates 7% 3570 United Arab Emirates 14% 3570
Uganda 3 Germany 13% 6178 India 7% 5691 China 6% 9468
Vietnam 1 United States 46% 13159 China 15% 2331 China 20% 2331
Vietnam 2 Singapore 18% 2207 Singapore 14% 2207 Singapore 15% 2207
Vietnam 3 Japan 16% 3673 Japan 14% 3673 Japan 12% 3673
Yemen 1 Japan 19% 9509 United Arab Emirates 12% 1466 United Arab Emirates 16% 1466
Yemen 2 Germany 10% 5198 China 10% 7417 Saudi Arabia 13% 1063
Yemen 3 Saudi Arabia 10% 1063 United States 8% 11120 India 12% 3691
Zambia 1 United Kingdom 18% 7947 South Africa 57% 2279 South Africa 55% 2279
Zambia 2 South Africa 14% 2279 Zimbabwe 10% 397 United Arab Emirates 9% 5275
Zambia 3 Japan 9% 12938 United Arab Emirates 4% 5275 Zimbabwe 6% 397
Zimbabwe 1 Malawi 36% 522 South Africa 54% 2186 South Africa 17% 2186
Zimbabwe 2 Switzerland 18% 7589 United Kingdom 4% 8293 China 15% 10898
Zimbabwe 3 Germany 14% 8061 Germany 4% 8061 Mozambique 11% 919




Appendix A5. Derivation of the Gravity Model in Panel based on Baier and 
Bergstrand (2009)  
 
 
In panel, the estimation of the system of equations (3) and (4) (in main text) raises issues 
related to estimation of the multilateral trade resistance index and estimation of transport 
costs. Actually, as we work with panel data, we can no more used fixed effects estimator that 
includes importer and exporter dummy variables to capture these multilateral resistance 
indexes (there is no reason to assume that  i P  and  j P  are constant over time). Then, we 
follow the simple method for approximating  i P  and  j P  proposed recently by Baier and 
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We apply a first-order log-linear Taylor-series expansion to the system of the 2N multilateral 
resistance term equations (A.18) (N being the number of countries) to generate a reduced 
form gravity equation that can be both easily estimated linearly and still consistent with the 
theoretical model of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). The Taylor-serie expansion is 
“centered” around a World with symmetric trade barriers, i.e.  , ijt t t tt = ∀ .  Under the 
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Equation (A.19) represents the GDP-share-weighted (geometric) average of the trade costs 
facing importer i across all exporter j in t, normalized by the (square root) of GDP-weighted 
average trade costs.46
 
 Holding constant (for a given year) bilateral determinant of trade, the 
largest is i’s multilateral resistance, the lower are bilateral trade costs relative to multilateral 
trade costs and hence the larger the bilateral imports of i from j in t will be. 
                                           
44 Baier and Bersgtrand (2009) initially proposed this method in a cross-section framework to allow 
for  both  efficient estimates of gravity equation and quantitative comparative-static effect without 
employing the structural system of equations. This approach has been used by Melitz (2008) in his 
inquiry of the role of language in foreign trade. But we also see in this method an interesting solution 
for estimating the multilateral resistance term in panel.  
45 This equation corresponds to equation (19) in Baier and Bergstrand (2009, p. 80). See details on the 
derivation in Baier and Berstrand (2009). 
46 This normalization term is constant, for each year t, across country pairs.   48 
Taking the logarithm of both sides of the augmented trade cost function (14) (in main text): 
   
  123 ln ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ijt ij it jt tDKK ρρρ =++   (A.20) 
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Which can be re-written as:47
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with  t γ including all constant terms across country pairs of equation (A.21). Then, 
substituting ln it P  and ln jt P  in the log-linearized version of (A.17) gives the following 
equation (corresponding to equation (15) in main text): 
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And:    
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 5 6 1 32 43 1 , 1 , 21 , 21 β β θ β βσρ β σρ β σρ = = = = = −= −= − ,  t λ  is a vector of year 
dummies (including then all constant terms across country pairs such as ln wt Y in (A.17),  t γ in 
(A.22) or  world fuel price index),  ijt ij ijt ν µυ = + with  ij µ  is a specific bilateral random effect, 
and  ijt υ  is the idiosyncratic error term with the usual properties.  
                                           
47 If we strictly follow Baier and Bergstrand (2009), one should also introduce, in addition to 
multilateral distance and infrastructure, other multilateral “border” variables such as adjacency, 
language, colonial history, etc. Actually, if all these “border” variables, which are constant country-
pairs characteristics, are included in the specific bilateral effect, once re-computed as “multilateral” 
terms they are no longer constant. However, the time variation for all these multilateral “border” 
variables is only generated by the evolution of the weight i.e. the GDP-share of countries in the World, 
which is common for all country-pairs. Hence, if introducing these multilateral “border” variables in 
addition to multilateral “distance” (also invariant except for the GDP-share) are meaningful in cross-
section estimation, they are not relevant in panel, especially with also both bilateral specific effect and 
year dummies introduced in the equation.    